LIVIVO - The Search Portal for Life Sciences

zur deutschen Oberfläche wechseln
Advanced search

Search results

Result 1 - 6 of total 6

Search options

  1. Article ; Online: China needs a national intelligent syndromic surveillance system.

    Jia, Peng / Yang, Shujuan

    Nature medicine

    2020  Volume 26, Issue 7, Page(s) 990

    MeSH term(s) Artificial Intelligence ; COVID-19 ; China/epidemiology ; Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology ; Coronavirus Infections/virology ; Disease Outbreaks ; Electronic Health Records ; Epidemics ; Geographic Information Systems ; Humans ; Pandemics ; Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology ; Pneumonia, Viral/virology ; Sentinel Surveillance
    Keywords covid19
    Language English
    Publishing date 2020-06-01
    Publishing country United States
    Document type Letter
    ZDB-ID 1220066-9
    ISSN 1546-170X ; 1078-8956
    ISSN (online) 1546-170X
    ISSN 1078-8956
    DOI 10.1038/s41591-020-0921-5
    Database MEDical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System OnLINE

    More links

    Kategorien

  2. Article ; Online: Publisher Correction: China needs a national intelligent syndromic surveillance system.

    Jia, Peng / Yang, Shujuan

    Nature medicine

    2020  Volume 26, Issue 7, Page(s) 1149

    Abstract: An amendment to this paper has been published and can be accessed via a link at the top of the paper. ...

    Abstract An amendment to this paper has been published and can be accessed via a link at the top of the paper.
    Language English
    Publishing date 2020-06-17
    Publishing country United States
    Document type Published Erratum
    ZDB-ID 1220066-9
    ISSN 1546-170X ; 1078-8956
    ISSN (online) 1546-170X
    ISSN 1078-8956
    DOI 10.1038/s41591-020-0977-2
    Database MEDical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System OnLINE

    More links

    Kategorien

  3. Article ; Online: Biosafety threats of the rapidly established labs for SARS-CoV-2 tests in China.

    Yuan, Dan / Gao, Wenfeng / Liang, Shu / Yang, Shujuan / Jia, Peng

    Environment international

    2020  Volume 143, Page(s) 105964

    Abstract: ... intelligent syndromic surveillance system (NISSS), for better improving the safety of the labs at the greatest ... need and facilitating more comprehensive surveillance of risk for disease outbreak. ... CoV-2 tests in Sichuan Province of China was conducted. The degree of compliance with 39 criteria ...

    Abstract To increase the capacity of identifying coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection, many Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) labs have been established in a short period of time for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) nucleic acid tests all over the world. However, their biosafety has not been evaluated, which could have been the first gateway to SARS-CoV-2 transmission. During 9-11 March 2020, the first comprehensive evaluation of the biosafety in all 89 labs qualified for conducting SARS-CoV-2 tests in Sichuan Province of China was conducted. The degree of compliance with 39 criteria in five categories was evaluated: biosafety requirements for lab activities (14 criteria), sample transfer, acceptance and management (6 criteria), waste management (9 criteria), personnel training and protection (4 criteria), and lab environmental disinfection, emergency plans and accident handling (6 criteria). Our results revealed that, although an overall median compliance rate of 94.6% for 39 criteria, only four of 89 labs met all of them. Criteria in personnel training and protection have been most satisfactorily met, followed by lab environmental disinfection, emergency plans and accident handling. The most severe risk was the lack of automatic doors at the main entrance or in core operation areas, especially among labs in CDC and hospitals. This risk, together with failure for keeping pressure in the core operation areas 25 ± 5 Pa (mainly among labs in the third-party testing agencies), may cause accidental exposure to biological agents from lab activities. Other severe risk included failure for standard labeling of SARS-CoV-2 wastes and lacking regular monitoring of sterilization effects. Our findings would provide experiences and lessons for strengthening lab biosafety in other Chinese provinces, and also serve as an important reference for many other countries where such labs are being or will be quickly built for fighting the COVID-19. The information of lab safety should be considered to be internally linked to the national intelligent syndromic surveillance system (NISSS), for better improving the safety of the labs at the greatest need and facilitating more comprehensive surveillance of risk for disease outbreak.
    MeSH term(s) Betacoronavirus ; COVID-19 ; China ; Containment of Biohazards ; Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology ; Humans ; Pandemics ; Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology ; SARS-CoV-2
    Keywords covid19
    Language English
    Publishing date 2020-07-14
    Publishing country Netherlands
    Document type Letter
    ZDB-ID 554791-x
    ISSN 1873-6750 ; 0160-4120
    ISSN (online) 1873-6750
    ISSN 0160-4120
    DOI 10.1016/j.envint.2020.105964
    Database MEDical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System OnLINE

    More links

    Kategorien

  4. Article: Biosafety threats of the rapidly established labs for SARS-CoV-2 tests in China

    Yuan, Dan / Gao, Wenfeng / Liang, Shu / Yang, Shujuan / Jia, Peng

    Environ Int

    Abstract: ... intelligent syndromic surveillance system (NISSS), for better improving the safety of the labs at the greatest ... need and facilitating more comprehensive surveillance of risk for disease outbreak. ... CoV-2 tests in Sichuan Province of China was conducted. The degree of compliance with 39 criteria ...

    Abstract To increase the capacity of identifying coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection, many Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) labs have been established in a short period of time for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) nucleic acid tests all over the world. However, their biosafety has not been evaluated, which could have been the first gateway to SARS-CoV-2 transmission. During 9-11 March 2020, the first comprehensive evaluation of the biosafety in all 89 labs qualified for conducting SARS-CoV-2 tests in Sichuan Province of China was conducted. The degree of compliance with 39 criteria in five categories was evaluated: biosafety requirements for lab activities (14 criteria), sample transfer, acceptance and management (6 criteria), waste management (9 criteria), personnel training and protection (4 criteria), and lab environmental disinfection, emergency plans and accident handling (6 criteria). Our results revealed that, although an overall median compliance rate of 94.6% for 39 criteria, only four of 89 labs met all of them. Criteria in personnel training and protection have been most satisfactorily met, followed by lab environmental disinfection, emergency plans and accident handling. The most severe risk was the lack of automatic doors at the main entrance or in core operation areas, especially among labs in CDC and hospitals. This risk, together with failure for keeping pressure in the core operation areas 25 ± 5 Pa (mainly among labs in the third-party testing agencies), may cause accidental exposure to biological agents from lab activities. Other severe risk included failure for standard labeling of SARS-CoV-2 wastes and lacking regular monitoring of sterilization effects. Our findings would provide experiences and lessons for strengthening lab biosafety in other Chinese provinces, and also serve as an important reference for many other countries where such labs are being or will be quickly built for fighting the COVID-19. The information of lab safety should be considered to be internally linked to the national intelligent syndromic surveillance system (NISSS), for better improving the safety of the labs at the greatest need and facilitating more comprehensive surveillance of risk for disease outbreak.
    Keywords covid19
    Publisher WHO
    Document type Article
    Note WHO #Covidence: #641724
    Database COVID19

    Kategorien

  5. Article: Biosafety threats of the rapidly established labs for SARS-CoV-2 tests in China

    Yuan, Dan / Gao, Wenfeng / Liang, Shu / Yang, Shujuan / Jia, Peng

    Environment international. 2020 Oct., v. 143

    2020  

    Abstract: ... intelligent syndromic surveillance system (NISSS), for better improving the safety of the labs at the greatest ... need and facilitating more comprehensive surveillance of risk for disease outbreak. ... CoV-2 tests in Sichuan Province of China was conducted. The degree of compliance with 39 criteria ...

    Abstract To increase the capacity of identifying coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection, many Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) labs have been established in a short period of time for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) nucleic acid tests all over the world. However, their biosafety has not been evaluated, which could have been the first gateway to SARS-CoV-2 transmission. During 9–11 March 2020, the first comprehensive evaluation of the biosafety in all 89 labs qualified for conducting SARS-CoV-2 tests in Sichuan Province of China was conducted. The degree of compliance with 39 criteria in five categories was evaluated: biosafety requirements for lab activities (14 criteria), sample transfer, acceptance and management (6 criteria), waste management (9 criteria), personnel training and protection (4 criteria), and lab environmental disinfection, emergency plans and accident handling (6 criteria). Our results revealed that, although an overall median compliance rate of 94.6% for 39 criteria, only four of 89 labs met all of them. Criteria in personnel training and protection have been most satisfactorily met, followed by lab environmental disinfection, emergency plans and accident handling. The most severe risk was the lack of automatic doors at the main entrance or in core operation areas, especially among labs in CDC and hospitals. This risk, together with failure for keeping pressure in the core operation areas 25 ± 5 Pa (mainly among labs in the third-party testing agencies), may cause accidental exposure to biological agents from lab activities. Other severe risk included failure for standard labeling of SARS-CoV-2 wastes and lacking regular monitoring of sterilization effects. Our findings would provide experiences and lessons for strengthening lab biosafety in other Chinese provinces, and also serve as an important reference for many other countries where such labs are being or will be quickly built for fighting the COVID-19. The information of lab safety should be considered to be internally linked to the national intelligent syndromic surveillance system (NISSS), for better improving the safety of the labs at the greatest need and facilitating more comprehensive surveillance of risk for disease outbreak.
    Keywords COVID-19 infection ; Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 ; accidents ; biosafety ; compliance ; disease outbreaks ; disinfection ; environment ; human resources ; monitoring ; nucleic acids ; risk ; waste management ; China
    Language English
    Dates of publication 2020-10
    Publishing place Elsevier Ltd
    Document type Article
    Note NAL-AP-2-clean
    ZDB-ID 554791-x
    ISSN 1873-6750 ; 0160-4120
    ISSN (online) 1873-6750
    ISSN 0160-4120
    DOI 10.1016/j.envint.2020.105964
    Database NAL-Catalogue (AGRICOLA)

    More links

    Kategorien

To top