Article: Mental Misrepresentation in Non-human Psychopathology.
2017 Volume 10, Issue 2, Page(s) 195–210
Abstract: In this paper, we defend a representational approach to at least some kinds of non-human psychopathology. Mentally-ill non-human minds, in particular in delusions, obsessive-compulsive disorders and similar cognitive states, are traditionally understood ... ...
Abstract | In this paper, we defend a representational approach to at least some kinds of non-human psychopathology. Mentally-ill non-human minds, in particular in delusions, obsessive-compulsive disorders and similar cognitive states, are traditionally understood in purely behavioral terms. In contrast, we argue that non-human mental psychopathology should be at least sometimes not only ascribed contentful mental representation but also understood as really having these states. To defend this view, we appeal to the interactivist account of mental representation, which is a kind of a constructive approach to meaning. We follow Mark Bickhard in assuming that only an organism - either human or non-human - capable of detecting its own misrepresentations is representational. However, under his autonomy-based account of biological function these minds are incapable of misrepresentations because these minds are, |
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Language | English |
Publishing date | 2017-08-04 |
Publishing country | Netherlands |
Document type | Journal Article |
ZDB-ID | 2438404-5 |
ISSN | 1875-1350 ; 1875-1342 |
ISSN (online) | 1875-1350 |
ISSN | 1875-1342 |
DOI | 10.1007/s12304-017-9299-2 |
Database | MEDical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System OnLINE |
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