Article: Preemptive bidding and Pareto efficiency in takeover auctions
Economics letters. 2017 Oct., v. 159
2017
Abstract: This paper extends the Fishman (1988) model of preemptive jump bidding in private value takeover auction to auctions with common and affiliated values. We show that in the presence of a common value component, jump bidding equilibrium results in higher ... ...
Abstract | This paper extends the Fishman (1988) model of preemptive jump bidding in private value takeover auction to auctions with common and affiliated values. We show that in the presence of a common value component, jump bidding equilibrium results in higher social surplus. Furthermore, we show that, under certain conditions, allowing for preemptive jump bidding in common value auctions results in ex-ante Pareto improvement. |
---|---|
Keywords | auctions ; models |
Language | English |
Dates of publication | 2017-10 |
Size | p. 214-216. |
Publishing place | Elsevier B.V. |
Document type | Article |
ISSN | 0165-1765 |
DOI | 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.014 |
Database | NAL-Catalogue (AGRICOLA) |
More links
Kategorien
Order via subito
This service is chargeable due to the Delivery terms set by subito. Orders including an article and supplementary material will be classified as separate orders. In these cases, fees will be demanded for each order.
Inter-library loan at ZB MED
Your chosen title can be delivered directly to ZB MED Cologne location if you are registered as a user at ZB MED Cologne.