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  1. Book ; Online: Matching markets with farsighted couples

    Atay, Ata / Funck, Sylvain / Mauleon, Ana / Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    2023  

    Abstract: We adopt the notion of the farsighted stable set to determine which matchings are stable when agents are farsighted in matching markets with couples. We show that a singleton matching is a farsighted stable set if and only if the matching is stable. Thus, ...

    Abstract We adopt the notion of the farsighted stable set to determine which matchings are stable when agents are farsighted in matching markets with couples. We show that a singleton matching is a farsighted stable set if and only if the matching is stable. Thus, matchings that are stable with myopic agents remain stable when agents become farsighted. Examples of farsighted stable sets containing multiple non-stable matchings are provided for markets with and without stable matchings. For couples markets where the farsighted stable set does not exist, we propose the DEM farsighted stable set to predict the matchings that are stable when agents are farsighted.
    Keywords Economics - Theoretical Economics ; Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory ; 91B68
    Publishing date 2023-04-24
    Publishing country us
    Document type Book ; Online
    Database BASE - Bielefeld Academic Search Engine (life sciences selection)

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  2. Book ; Online: School Choice with Farsighted Students

    Atay, Ata / Mauleon, Ana / Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    2022  

    Abstract: We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the ... ...

    Abstract We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC.
    Keywords Economics - Theoretical Economics ; Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
    Publishing date 2022-12-14
    Publishing country us
    Document type Book ; Online
    Database BASE - Bielefeld Academic Search Engine (life sciences selection)

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  3. Book ; Online: Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching

    Atay, Ata / Mauleon, Ana / Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    2022  

    Abstract: We consider priority-based matching problems with limited farsightedness. We show that, once agents are sufficiently farsighted, the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm becomes stable: a singleton set consisting of the TTC ... ...

    Abstract We consider priority-based matching problems with limited farsightedness. We show that, once agents are sufficiently farsighted, the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm becomes stable: a singleton set consisting of the TTC matching is a horizon-$k$ vNM stable set if the degree of farsightedness is greater than three times the number of agents in the largest cycle of the TTC. On the contrary, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm may not belong to any horizon-$k$ vNM stable set for $k$ large enough.

    Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2212.07108
    Keywords Economics - Theoretical Economics ; Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
    Publishing date 2022-12-14
    Publishing country us
    Document type Book ; Online
    Database BASE - Bielefeld Academic Search Engine (life sciences selection)

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    Inter-library loan at ZB MED

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  4. Article ; Online: Strongly rational sets for normal-form games

    Grandjean, Gilles / Mauleon, Ana / Vannetelbosch, Vincent J

    Economic theory bulletin Vol. 5, No. 1 , p. 35-46

    2017  Volume 5, Issue 1, Page(s) 35–46

    Author's details Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
    Keywords Set-valued solution concept ; Strong Nash equilibrium ; Coalition ; Strong curb set ; Learning
    Language English
    Size Online-Ressource
    Publisher Springer Internat. Publ
    Publishing place Cham
    Document type Article ; Online
    ZDB-ID 2733052-7
    ISSN 2196-1093
    Database ECONomics Information System

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  5. Article: Contractually stable alliances

    Mauleon, Ana / Sempere-Monerris, Jose J / Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    Journal of public economic theory Vol. 18, No. 2 , p. 212-225

    2016  Volume 18, Issue 2, Page(s) 212–225

    Author's details Ana Mauleon, Jose J. Sempere-Monerris and Vincent Vannetelbosch
    Language English
    Publisher Blackwell
    Publishing place Malden, Mass. [u.a.]
    Document type Article
    ZDB-ID 1468434-2 ; 1478348-4
    ISSN 1467-9779 ; 1097-3923
    ISSN (online) 1467-9779
    ISSN 1097-3923
    Database ECONomics Information System

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  6. Article: Bargaining in endogenous trading networks

    Bedayo, Mikel / Mauleon, Ana / Vannetelbosch, Vincent J

    Mathematical social sciences Vol. 80 , p. 70-82

    2016  Volume 80, Page(s) 70–82

    Author's details Mikel Bedayo, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
    Language English
    Publisher NH, Elsevier
    Publishing place Amsterdam [u.a.]
    Document type Article
    ZDB-ID 283230-6 ; 2005402-6
    ISSN 0165-4896
    ISSN 0165-4896
    Database ECONomics Information System

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  7. Book ; Online: Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information

    Mauleon, Ana / Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    (CORE discussion paper ; 2013,34)

    2013  

    Author's details Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent
    Series title CORE discussion paper ; 2013,34
    Language English
    Size Online-Ressource (12 S.)
    Publisher CORE
    Publishing place Louvain-la-Neuve
    Document type Book ; Online
    Note IMD-Felder maschinell generiert
    Database ECONomics Information System

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  8. Article ; Online: Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information

    Mauleon, Ana / Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    Games Vol. 4, No. 3 , p. 329-338

    2013  Volume 4, Issue 3, Page(s) 329–338

    Abstract: We consider Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns about the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find ... ...

    Author's details Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
    Abstract We consider Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns about the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent with stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party’s relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.
    Keywords relative concerns ; alternating-offer bargaining ; private information ; maximal delays
    Language English
    Size Online-Ressource
    Publisher MDPI
    Publishing place Basel
    Document type Article ; Online
    Note IMD-Felder maschinell generiert
    ZDB-ID 2527220-2
    ISSN 2073-4336
    DOI 10.3390/g4030329
    Database ECONomics Information System

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  9. Book ; Online: Constitutions and social networks

    Mauleon, Ana / Roehl, Nils / Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    (Nota di lavoro / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei : Climate Change and Sustainable Development ; 59.2015)

    2015  

    Abstract: The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific ... ...

    Author's details Ana Mauleon; Nils Roehl; Vincent Vannetelbosch
    Series title Nota di lavoro / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei : Climate Change and Sustainable Development ; 59.2015
    Abstract The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutions, we consider a social network to be stable if no group is modified any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players' preferences under which stable social networks are induced for sure. Furthermore, by embedding many-to-many matchings into our setting, we apply our model to job markets with labor unions. To some extent the unions may provide job guarantees and, therefore, have influence on the stability of the job market.
    Keywords Social Networks ; Constitutions ; Stability ; Many-to-Many Matchings
    Language Undetermined
    Size Online-Ressource (37 S.)
    Publisher Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
    Publishing place Milano
    Document type Book ; Online
    Database ECONomics Information System

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  10. Article: Allocation rules for coalitional network games

    Caulier, Jean-François / Mauleon, Ana / Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    Mathematical social sciences Vol. 78 , p. 80-88

    2015  Volume 78, Page(s) 80–88

    Author's details Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
    Language English
    Publisher NH, Elsevier
    Publishing place Amsterdam [u.a.]
    Document type Article
    ZDB-ID 283230-6 ; 2005402-6
    ISSN 0165-4896
    ISSN 0165-4896
    Database ECONomics Information System

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