Article: On gamesmen and fair men: explaining fairness in non-cooperative bargaining games.
2018 Volume 5, Issue 2, Page(s) 171709
Abstract: Experiments on bargaining games have repeatedly shown that subjects fail to use backward induction, and that they only rarely make demands in accordance with the subgame perfect equilibrium. In a recent paper, we proposed an alternative model, termed ' ... ...
| Abstract | Experiments on bargaining games have repeatedly shown that subjects fail to use backward induction, and that they only rarely make demands in accordance with the subgame perfect equilibrium. In a recent paper, we proposed an alternative model, termed 'economic harmony' in which we modified the individual's utility by defining it as a function of the ratio between the actual and aspired pay-offs. We also abandoned the notion of equilibrium, in favour of a new notion of 'harmony', defined as the intersection of strategies, at which all players are equally satisfied. We showed that the proposed model yields excellent predictions of offers in the ultimatum game, and requests in the sequential common pool resource dilemma game. Strikingly, the predicted demand in the ultimatum game is equal to the famous Golden Ratio (approx. 0.62 of the entire pie). The same prediction was recently derived independently by Schuster (Schuster 2017. |
|---|---|
| Language | English |
| Publishing date | 2018-02-28 |
| Publishing country | England |
| Document type | Journal Article |
| ZDB-ID | 2787755-3 |
| ISSN | 2054-5703 |
| ISSN | 2054-5703 |
| DOI | 10.1098/rsos.171709 |
| Database | MEDical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System OnLINE |
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